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THE CONTRACT OF SALE
IN LATIN AMERICA
HENRY PAINE CRAWFORD t
The contract of sale in civil law-more commonly referred
to as purchase and sale'--is defined in the civil codes of Italy
and Venezuela as "a contract by which one person binds himself
to give a thing and another to pay the price."2
Brazil describes it in its Code of Commerce: The mercantile
contract of purchase and sale is perfect and concluded as soon
as the purchaser and the seller are in accord as to the thing,
the price and the conditions, and from that moment neither of
the parties may repent (withdraw) without the consent of the
other even though the thing has not been delivered nor the
price paid. It is understood, in conditional sales, that the con-
tract is not deemed perfect until the condition has been
fulfilled.'
t Member of the bars of the District of Columbia, Georgia, and Califor-
nia; Chief, Latin American Legal Section, Division of Commercial Laws,
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. For other writings by the same
author, see Tulane Law Review, vols. X, XI, XII, XIII, and XIV; Journal of
the District of Columbia Bar Association, 1937; Handbook of Latin American
Studies, Harvard University Press, 1936, 1937, and 1938.
'Spanish, compraventa; Portuguese, compra e venda; Italian, vendita.
2-Art. 1513, Civil Code, Venezuela, i92Z; art. 1447, Civil Code, Fran-
chi, Milan, 1936. Cf., Clark v. Gault, 77 Ohio St. 497 (19o8): A sale is a
contract founded on a money consideration by which the absolute or general
property in the subj ect of the sale is transferred from the seller to the buyer.
a Art. 191, Commercial Code, Bevilaqua, Rio de Janeiro, 1932. See also,
art. 450, Code of Commerce, Argentina, Lajouane, Buenos Aires, 1932.
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The case law of Mexico, as developed by the Suprema
Corte de Jisticia, declares that the contract of purchase and sale
is perfect when the thing and its price are specified, and mutual
consent is manifested. Once perfected, the parties remain
legally bound to its performance, the vendor to deliver the
thing sold, in the place or to the person designated, and the
buyer to pay the price stipulated.4
WHAT CONSTITUTES A COMMERCIAL SALE?
Whether a transaction be civil or commercial will deter-
mine whether a controversy arising therefrom is to be decided
according to the rules of the civil or commercial code. In some
cases, the effect might be fatal respecting the injured party.
For example, in Cuba, actions relating to the possession of
personalty are barred in six years under the Civil Code (Arts.
1955, 1962), whereas the same type of action under the Code
of Commerce against the security of an intermediary agent will
be barred in six months from the date of receipt of the com-
mercial securities or funds delivered to him for business pur-
poses (Art. 946). Again, in sales of realty or personalty, the
action arising from differences in quantity or quality is barred
in six months under the Civil Code (Arts. 1469-1472, 1490),
yet the same type of action under the Code of Commerce must
be brought within four days if the merchandise is received
packed (Art. 336), or within thirty days after receipt when
founded upon hidden defects (Art. 342).'
According to one Mexican decision, the contract of purchase
and sale, as to its civil and commercial effects, should be ana-
lyzed in accordance with the precepts of the Civil Code and
Code of Commerce. In the first case, the contract is concluded
' Lopez Hermanos, x6 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca 653 (March z4,
1925).
1 Cf., art. 1568, Civil Code, Venezuela; redhibitory actions for defects,
realty one year, personalty three months; Code of Commerce, actions for appar-
ent defects, two days after receipt; for hidden defects, two days after discov-
ery provided buyer not guilty of "lack of diligence"; when goods packed,
eight days (art. 153).
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when the contracting parties have placed themselves in accord
respecting the thing and the price; in the second (or commer-
cial), the sale is taken as concluded from the precise moment in
which the merchandise leaves the power of the vendor to be
delivered to the purchaser.'
While this may serve to indicate a distinction between the
two types of contract, it by no means determines what consti-
tutes a civil or commercial contract of sale. The true test is
whether the subject matter of the sale is intended for use or
consumption by the purchaser, or whether it is intended for
resale at a profit.'
Spain offers one of the most logical and succinct definitions
of what constitutes a mercantile contract of purchase and sale
(compraventa mercantil):
The purchase and sale of movable things for the purpose of reselling
them, either in the same form in which they were bought, or in another
different form, with the intention of profiting in the resale, shall be
mercantile.'
According to the case law of the Supreme Court of Spain,
the essence of this type of contract is the animus or intention
with which it was perfected. Hence, if it was the intention of
the purchaser to profit by the resale of the subject matter, even
though he may have applied to his own use part of the mov-
able things acquired, it is none the less a mercantile contract of
sale in its entirety. On the other hand, if the purchaser did
not have such an intention, the resale of the remainder does
not take away the character of an ordinary or common contract
even though he may have obtained a profit.9
o Fernando Dosal & Cia., 15 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca 1i45
(November 8, 1924).
7This appears to be the test even when the subject matter of the contract
is real property if bought to resell for gain. See notes 9, 1o, and i i, infra.
Further, the writer finds no distinction between wholesale and retail sales in
this connection. Merchants are defined simply as "those who, having legal
capacity to exercise commerce, dedicate themselves to it habitually, (and)
mercantile or industrial companies which shall be constituted in accord with
this Code." (Art. i, Code of Commerce, Betancourt, zd ed., Habana, 1917.)
8 Art. 325, Code of Commerce, Spain, 1885.
'Sentencia, June 3, 1898, Supreme Court of Spain. Cuban code law
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Without doubt the increasing importance of purchases of
land for the purpose of reselling it in small lots or after the
erection of buildings has influenced contemporary Spanish law
to depart from a rigid interpretation as to what may or may
not constitute a mercantile contract of purchase and sale, leav-
ing the courts at liberty to classify contracts as either civil or
commercial, according to the circumstances. 0
That the mercantile contract of purchase and sale is recog-
nized in Mexico in respect of real property seems dear from
the case law of the Supreme Court, although in order that the
compraventa mercantil may exist as to real property (bienes
rdices) it is required that the contract be concluded for the
purpose of commercial speculation. If this intention is not
deducible "in a clear and precise manner" from the contract
itself, it becomes necessary to adduce other proof to show the
mercantile character of the instrument.1'
Inversely, it is important to know what does not constitute
a commercial sale. As a general rule, noncommercial sales may
be grouped into four classes: (i) Purchases of things intended
for use or consumption, (2) sales by the owners of crops or the
natural increase of cattle, or payment in kind under certain
follows Spanish case law in practically the same text (art. 325, Code of Com-
merce, Betancourt, 2d ed., Habana, 1917).
10 See footnote to art. 325, Code of Commerce, Spain, 1885, p. 177;
also, Mora, Vda. de Sosa, 26 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca 155 (May 6,
1929), Supreme Court of Mexico, dealing with the rights of the parties under
a nonformalized contract of purchase and sale of real property.
11 Gabriel Siller, 22 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca 685 (March 24,
i929). Author's note: In relying upon case law (stare decisis) as developed
by the Supreme Court of Mexico, it must be remembered that five concordant
and consecutive decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice in chambers, con-
curred in by at least four justices, or an equal number of judgments by the
same court en bane, which have been approved by at least eleven members, are
required to constitute a legal precedent. (Art. 193, Ley de Amparo, Decem-
ber 30, 1935). Due to obvious limitations of time and space, the writer has
not attempted to cite every case in point, and although in several instances
more than one decision on the same question has been found, he is not pre-
pared to state that five decisions do or do not exist respecting every point
raised. No research was made in Mexican case law prior to 1917, the date of
the present Mexican Federal Constitution.
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circumstances, (3) sales by artisans of their own products made
in their own shops, and (4) the resale by any person not a
merchant of the remainder of commodities which he has accu-
mulated for his own consumption." Argentina adds a fifth-
the purchase of real property and its movable accessories," and
in Venezuela the insurance of things not in commerce, as well
as life insurance, is an act of commerce with respect to the
insurer only."4
WHEN DOES TITLE PASS?
This question is answered by the long article describing the
sale in Brazilian commercial law-as soon as there is a com-
plete meeting of the minds-but it does not say precisely, in
so many words, that title has actually passed.'" The civil codes
of Italy and Venezuela, however, leave no doubt as to the
transfer of ownership:
The sale is perfect between the parties, and the buyer acquires the
title with respect to the seller as soon as they are agreed upon the thing
and the price, even though delivery of the thing has not been made,
nor the price paid.'"
While a similar rule is inferable from Article 2249 of the
Mexican Civil Code, again it is not actually stated. However,
the article seems in harmony with the doctrine in the Lopez
'2 Art. 326, Code of Commerce, Spain, 1 885; Venezuela, art. 5, Code of
Commerce, 1919.
" Art. 452, Code of Commerce, Argentina, Lajouane, Buenos Aires,
193z.
"' Art. 6, Code of Commerce, Venezuela, 1919; see also, arts. 3, 4, 5
and 7 as to what does not constitute a mercantile contract of purchase and sale.
However, if the act is commercial for one of the parties, all contracting parties
are subject to commercial law (Argentina, art. 7; Venezuela, art. z). Argen-
tine courts have held that if the plaintiff merchant exercises an act of com-
merce he should appear before a commercial court even though the defendant
might buy for his own consumption (Cam. Civ., t. 50, p. 179, Malagarriga,
Codigo de Comercio Comentado, 3 d ed., Buenos Aires, 19z7, vol. I, sec. 19,
p. 29).
11 See note 3, supra; cf., see. 8398, Ohio G.C., likewise subject to crit-
icism for indefiniteness.
"g Art. 1448, Civil Code, Franchi, Milan, 1936; art. 1514, Civil Code,
Venezuela, 1922.
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Hermanos case"r to the effect that the contract of purchase and
sale is perfect when the thing sold and its price are specified,
and mutual consent is manifested.
SALES BY SAMPLES
If the sale has been made by samples or on the basis of a
certain quality generally recognized in commerce, the buyer
may not refuse to accept the things contracted for if they are
in accord with the sample or the quality specified in the con-
tract. In case the buyer refuses to accept them, experts will be
appointed by both parties to decide whether the goods should
or should not be accepted. If the experts declare in the affirm-
ative, the sale is considered consummated; if to the contrary,
the contract is rescinded without prejudice to the claims of the
buyer for damages. 8
However, in purchases of goods not in sight, and which
cannot be classified by a determined quality generally recog-
nized in commerce, it is understood, as a matter of law, that
the buyer reserves the right to examine them and to rescind
freely the contract if the goods are not satisfactory. The buyer
also has the right of rescission if, by express provisions, he has
reserved the right to try or test the merchandise (Art. 328)." 9
DELIVERY
If the seller fails to deliver the things sold within the time
specified, the buyer may demand performance or rescission of
the contract with full indemnity in either case for the damages
caused by the delay (Art. 329). In contracts which stipulate a
17 See note 4, supra. Note: The Lopez decision refers to a mercantile
contract of sale.
"'Art. 327, Code of Commerce, Betancourt, 2d ed., Habana, 1917;
Mexico, 373; Spain, 327; Chile, 435; Argentina, 456. Hereafter, references
to the Cuban Code of Commerce will be given in parentheses in the text, while
references to comparative legislation will be given in the footnotes. The num-
ber following the name of the country indicates the corresponding article of
its code of commerce.
'" Mexico, 374; Spain, 3 z 8; Chile, 13 0, 131 ; Argentina, 455 ; Italy, 6 1.
Cf., sec. 8396, Ohio G.C., sale by sample.
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fixed quantity for delivery within a fixed period of time, the
buyer is not obliged to accept a part, even under the promise
of delivery of the rest. But if he accepts partial delivery, the
sale is consummated with respect to the things received, saving
the right of the buyer to order the performance of the contract
as to the remainder, or its rescission in accordance with the pre-
ceding article (Art. 330). -0'
Loss OR DETERIORATION
The loss or deterioration of the subject matter of the con-
tract before its delivery by an unforeseen accident or without
negligence on the part of the seller, enables the buyer to
rescind the contract, except where the seller has become a
depositary (bailee) of the merchandise in accordance with
article 339, infra, in which case the liability of the seller is lim-
ited to that arising from the contract of deposit (Art. 33).
The latter is similar to our bailment. When the buyer, without
just cause, refuses to accept the things purchased, the seller
may demand performance or rescission of the contract, deposit-
ing the subject matter judicially in the first case. The judicial
deposit may also be utilized by the seller whenever the buyer
delays taking charge of the merchandise. In such cases, the
expenses originating from the deposit will run for the account
of the party at fault (Art. 332). -1
RIsK OF THE BUYER
Under Cuban law, the damages and shrinkage of the sub-
ject matter after the contract has been perfected and the seller
has the goods at the disposal of the buyer, in the place and at
20 Mexico, 375; Spain, 330; Chile, 157; Argentina, 468; cf., secs. 8424,
8425 Ohio G.C. See also, Lopez Hermanos, 16 Semanario Judicial, Quinta
Epoca 653 (March 24, 1925): In order that the virtual delivery of the thing
,old be taken as complete, it is necessary that the buyer acknowledge that the
merchandise remains at his disposal.
"" Mexico, 377; Spain, 331, 333, 334; Chile, I42; Italy, 66, 68. The
judicial deposit in civil law is equivalent to the common law procedure of
placing the thing litigated in the custody of the court.
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the time agreed upon, run for the account of the buyer except
in cases of fraud or negligence (Art. 333)Y
RISK OF THE SELLER
On the other hand, the damages and shrinkage which the
merchandise may suffer, even by a fortuitous happening (caso
fortito), run for the account of the seller (I) if the sale has
been made according to number, weight or measure, or where
the thing sold is not certain and determined by marks or signs
which identify it; (2) if, by express agreement or commercial
usage, taking into consideration the nature of the thing sold,
the buyer has the right to inspect or examine it beforehand;
or (3) if the contract contains the provision that delivery will
not be made until the thing sold acquires the conditions stipu-
lated (Art. 334). In any case, if the things sold perish or
deteriorate while they are under the control of the seller, the
latter must return to the buyer the part of the price already
received (Art. 335)23
EXPENSES OF DELIVERY
If a fixed period for the delivery of the things sold has not
been stipulated, the seller must have them at the disposal of
the buyer within 24 hours after the conclusion of the contract
(Art. 337). The expenses of delivery in commercial sales run
for the account of the seller until the goods are placed, weighed
or measured, at the disposal of the buyer, unless an express
agreement to the contrary exists. However, the expenses of
22 Mexico, 378; Chile, 143, 149, 150; Argentina, 463, 465. See also,
Lopez Hermanos, note 4: The losses, damages and shrinkage which the mer-
chandise sold may suffer will be for the account of the buyer if the thing has
been delivered, and for the account of the seller if delivery has not been made.
23 Mexico, 377; Spain, 331, 333, 334; Chile, 147, 143; Italy, 61, 66.
The rule regarding things which have perished or deteriorated appears to be
general; the Argentine Code declares that when the lack of the delivery of the
effects sold is due to the fact that they have perished or have deteriorated by
unforeseen accidents, without blame of the seller, all responsibility ceases on
the part of the latter, and the contract remains rescinded in law, the price
being returned to the buyer (art. 467, Corn.).
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their receipt or extraction outside of the place of delivery run
for the account of the buyer (Art. 338).24
PAYM ENT-DEPOSIT-VENDOR'S LIEN
As soon as the subject matter of the contract has been
placed at the disposal of the buyer, and the latter has expressed
his satisfaction or the merchandise has been deposited judicially
in the case provided for in Article 332, supra, the obligation
arises on the part of the buyer to pay the price against account
rendered (al contado) or according to the time agreed upon
with the seller.2" The latter may thus be converted into a
depositary of the things sold, and is liable for their custody
and conservation in accordance with the laws governing deposits
(Art. 339).2" During the time the goods are in the possession
of the seller, even though in the nature of a deposit, he has a
preference or seller's lien for the payment of the price against
any other creditor, with interest for the delay (Art. 340.)27 In
any event, delay in payment of the price places the buyer under
the obligation of paying legal interest on the amount owed the
seller (Art. 34).2"
DEFECTS - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The buyer who, at the time of receiving the thing sold, ex-
amines it to his satisfaction, has no right of action for recovery
against the seller for a defect of quantity or quality. However,
the buyer has his right of action against the seller for a defect
in the quantity or quality of merchandise received in bales or
packed, provided he bring his action within four days after
24 Mexico, 379, 382; Spain, 33 z , 337, 338; Chile, 144, et seq.; Argen-
tina, 460, 461; Italy, 68; cf., sec. 8423, Ohio G.C.
25 Cf., sec. 8422, Ohio G.C.
211 Argentina, 464, 465.
27 Mexico, 386; Spain, 340; Chile, 151; Argentina, 466.
2, Mexico, 380; Spain, 341; Chile, 144, et seq. Delay constitutes an
obligation to pay interest upon the amount owing at the legal rate. See Arm-
strong Packing Co., z3 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca 933 (August 20,
1928).
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date of receipt, and provided further, that the damage (averia)
does not arise from a fortuitous happening (caso fortiiito), an
inherent defect (vicio propio de la cosa), or fraud. In such
cases, the buyer may elect as to rescission or specific perform-
ance, holding the seller liable for the damages caused by the
defects or shortages. Nevertheless, the seller may avoid such
a claim by insisting that the inspection for quantity and quality
be made by the buyer in the act of delivery (Art. 336).2
Inherent Defects: The buyer who fails to file his claim for
inherent or hidden defects (vicios internos) within thirty days
after delivery loses all right of action to recover against the
seller for this cause (Art. 342). However, the party who has
proceeded with malice or fraud must respond for the damages
thus caused, without prejudice to the corresponding criminal
proceedings (Art. 344), and in every commercial sale, the
seller is bound to respond to the buyer for his warranty of tide,
peaceful possession, and against hidden or inherent defects
(Art. 345). 30
PRICE
In Chile, there is no sale if the parties fail to agree on the
price or the manner of determining it; but if the thing sold
should be delivered, it is presumed that the parties have agreed
upon the current price which the thing had as of the date and
2 Mexico, 383; Spain, 336, 342; Chile, 158, 159; Argentina, 473;
Italy, 70; cf., Manton v. Perry, 9 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 326, 328 (1908): Un-
der an implied warranty of fitness, it is the duty of the buyer of goods to
notify the seller of any defective condition immediately upon discovery. If
the buyer, after full opportunity for inspection, retains goods and resells
them, he has waived any claim he might have had for damages. See also, secs.
8427, 8428, 8429, Ohio G.C.
30 Ibid. See also, Mexico, 384; Spain, 345; Chile, 154. In Ohio, the
purchaser has an option, in case of a breach of warranty, of terminating the
contract, and returning or tendering back all goods at the place where he had
received them from the seller, or he may retain the goods and sue for damages
for the breach of the warranty. Strouse v. Schenck, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 443
(I9z8). But where goods delivered under a contract of sale are retained and
used after inspection or after a reasonable opportunity for inspection, any
defect in them is thereby waived. Bigalow Fruit Co. v. Huxley, 23 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) 479, 481 (1912). See Sec. 8449, Ohio G.C.
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place of the contract. Where there is a diversity of prices at the
same time and place, the buyer will pay the average price (pre-
cio mnedlo). This rule is applicable also in case the parties refer
to the price the thing may have at a time and place different
from the time and place of the contract. 1 Moreover, if the
third party to whom the fixing of the price has been entrusted
fails to do so, whatever the reason may be, and the subject mat-
ter has been delivered, the contract will be carried out by the
one who had the thing the day the contract was concluded, and
in case of a variation in prices, then at the average price. 3
However, those sums which are paid in commercial sales as
earnest money (sefial) are always deemed a payment on account
of the price and as proof of ratification of the contract unless a
contrary stipulation appears (Art. 343)."
LESI6N
In conformity with the thesis of the civil law contract of
purchase and sale, commercial sales will not be subject to rescis-
sion because of lesi6n (Art. 344.)3" The latter has a meaning
peculiarly its own, other than that usually ascribed to it in the
ordinary dictionary. It is believed that the nearest approach to
a correct translation into English would be "partial failure of
consideration." Lesi6n is defined by Escriche as "the damage
or prejudice which is caused in contracts for a valuable consid-
eration, and especially in purchases and sales, by not making
them in their just price:" 5 There were two degrees of lesi6n
" Art. 139, Code of Commerce, Chile, 1865, official ed., 1937; cf.,
art. 142, Code of Commerce, Venezuela, 1919; also sec. 8389, Ohio G.C.
:" Art. 140, Chile; cf., art. 142, Venezuela, sec. 8390, Ohio G.C., price
fixed by third person. The Chilean rule in the last sentence of this paragraph
appears confusing. The writer interprets it to signify that "the one who had
the thing the day the contract was concluded," if the vendor, must deliver at
the average price; if already delivered to the vendee, the latter must pay the
average price.
M exico, 381; Spain, 34-3; Chile, 107-109; Argentina, 475.
: Art. 385, Codigo de Comercio Reformado, Andrade, Mexico, 1936.
3 Escriche, Diccionario de Legislaci6n y Jurisprudencia, Paris and Mex-
icO, 1920, p. 1 16o. Cf., Cuba, 344; Mexico, 385; Spain, 344; Chile, 1z6,
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under early Spanish law, lesi6t enorme and lesi6n enormfsima.
The former is the degree of damage suffered by "having been
deceived in something less than the half of the just price"; the
latter, "in much more than the half of the just price.""
Lesion enorme was sufficient cause for rescission of the con-
tract.3 In any event, lesi6n appears to operate in two ways-
when the seller sells at a price greater than the fair value of the
thing, or when the buyer buys at price less than the fair value,
provided deception be present."
Thus, lesi6n arises where a thing which "justly was worth
ten, had been sold for more than fifteen, or bought for less than
five." "9 Upon proof of the lesi6n and the deceit (engafo), the
injured party may claim the return of the "excess of the just
price which the thing had at the time of the sale, or that there
be given back what is lacking up to this, or that the contract be
rescinded and annulled, each one taking what he gave to the
other."4
38 Escriche, op. cit., p. ii 6o.
37 Ibid. Whether the doctrine of lesi6n would operate to sustain rescission
under modern commercial law would necessarily be determined by the juris-
prudence of the respective forum. In contemporary practice, the proper rem-
edy, as a general rule, is an action for damages against the party guilty of
"malice or fraud," without prejudice to criminal proceedings (Cuba, 344;
Mexico, 385; Spain, 344-).
8Art. 1074, Civil Code, Spain, 1889, provides that partitions of an
inheritance may be rescinded for cause of leskdn in more than the fourth part,
taking into consideration the value of the things when adjudicated. Art. 1079
denies rescission of the partition on the ground of lesdnv because of the mere
omission of some of the objects of the inheritance, holding that the inheritance
should be completed by adding to it the things omitted. The Supreme Court
of Spain has ruled that the omission, in partitions, even though it caused lesi6n
in more than the fourth part, does not give rise to rescission in the absence of
the requirement that such property be adjudicated. See Sentetzcia, February
z8, 193o, as reported by Fernandez, Diccionario de Jurisprudencia, Madrid,
1930, vol. 3, P- 7.
'9 This example was taken from Escriche, op. cit., p. i i 6o.
40 Ibid. It will be noted that the example abides by the more-or-less-than-
half variation, and seems analogous to the equitable precept against unjust
enrichment.
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BREACH OF WARRANTY
The alleged breach of an implied warranty as to fitness in
a mercantile contract of sale was recently brought to the writer's
attention. We can select Mexico as the country for our ex-
ample, its case and statute law being identical with that of the
jurisdiction in which the claim arose.
We will assume that an American manufacturer has in
Mexico a mere sales representative without power to bind the
company, all of whose orders are subject to approval and
acceptance in the United States. As the result of his efforts the
company receives an order by mail amounting to $22,0o0, and
accepts it at its home office in the United States. Under the
terms of the contract payment is to be made upon delivery of
the goods at a place of embarkation in the United States. The
material was selected from line drawings in a catalogue, and
the contract was fully performed by both parties as of June i,
1939. Shortly after receipt of the material in Mexico, large
parts of it were resold to customers of the vendee.41
In September, after the material has been in use some three
months, the Mexican importer declares it is defective as to fit-
ness in comparison with other brands of similar products selling
throughout the industry at approximately the same price, and
threatens to sue the American manufacturer before Mexican
courts to recover a part of the price sufficient to compensate for
the alleged defect in quality. The product in question does not
come packed or in bales and may be readily inspected. The
plaintiff42 also contends that the defendant is "doing business"
in Mexico in the legal significance of the term, and is, therefore,
subject to the Mexican income tax law.
Serious doubt is entertained as to the means by which it
would be possible for Mexican courts to exercise jurisdiction
over the instant mercantile contract of purchase and sale. In
order to decide this question it will be necessary to consider
41 Cf., Manton v. Perry, note z9, supra.
42 The terms "plaintiff" and "defendant" are used arbitrarily to distin-
guish the parties; the suit has not yet been filed.
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(i) whether the action be civil or commercial, (2) real or per-
sonal, and (3) the competency or jurisdiction of the courts. 3
Commercial Nature of the Action
Under the definition of the Mexican Code of Commerce,
commercial actions are those which have for their purpose to
ventilate and decide controversies derived from acts of com-
merce."' It is submitted without further discussion that the
present controversy arises from a commercial transaction,"
hence is a commercial action within the purview of the Code of
Commerce, at least as to the defendant company."
Personal Nature of the Action
By means of acciones reales one claims inheritances, real
rights, or the declaration of release from real encumbrances.
They are exercised against the person who has the thing in his
power.". The accidn personal is one which the plaintiff brings
in order to demand the performance of a personal obligation,
or to claim from another person that the latter give, do, or
cease doing all that to which he was obligated."5 From these
definitions it would appear that the personal action is the type
which would be brought by the present plaintiff.4"
43 In the United States, it has been held as recently as February 14, I939,
that service of summons and complaint upon a foreign corporation by deliver-
ing a copy thereof to an officer of the corporation is not effective unless the
corporation is doing business within the state. Pioneer Utilities Corporation v.
Scott-Newman Inc., z6 F. Supp. 616.
44 Art. io49, Codigo de Comercio Reformado, Andrade, Mexico, 1936.
4s Arts. 4, 75, 76, Codigo de Comercio Reformado, Andrade, Mexico,
1936.
"
6 Art. 1050, Codigo de Comercio Reformado, Andrade, Mexico, 1936.
4 Art- 3, Codigo de Procedimientos Civiles, Santamaria, Mexico, 1934.
48 Enjuiciamiento Civil, Manresa y Navarro, 5th ed., Madrid, 19z8, p.
Z46; cf., art. 25, Codigo de P. C., Santamaria, Mexico, 1934.
4' The claim for damages and prejudices always signifies the exercise of
the personal action. Sentencia, January 7, 1931, Supreme Court of Spain.
Cf., Genin v. Grier, io Ohio zIO (1840): In Ohio, personal actions may be
prosecuted in any county where process can be served on the defendant. See
discussion at pp. 212, 213, and first half of 214. Mr. Justice Hitchcock has
(apparently without intention) drawn many of the distinctions existing be-
tween the real and the personal action in civil law. See also, St. John v. Par-
sons, 54 Ohio App. 420 (1936), in like vein.
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Service of Summons and Jurisdiction
Having found authority upon which to base the conclusion
that the action contemplated is commercial in nature, it is essen-
tial to investigate the competency of Mexican commercial
courts. In the first place, the initial service of summons in
Mexican commercial actions must be personal, although notice
of subsequent hearings in the same action may be served by
publication." Furthermore, a judgment which is rendered
without service of summons having been made upon the de-
fendant with all legal formalities amounts to a violation of con-
stitutional guaranties."' Consequently, it is difficult to conceive
of a valid service upon an unempowered nonlegal agent, such
as the sales representative described.
Under the previsions of Chapter VII (De las Competen-
cias) of Book V (De los Juicios Mercantiles),"' whatever may
be the action, the court of the place which the debtor has desig-
nated as the place of suit for payment, or the court of the place
designated in the contract for the performance of the obliga-
tion, will be preferred over any other court. 3 If neither desig-
nation has been made, the court of the domicile of the debtor
will be competent, whatever may be the action brought."
"' A,-isti de Argumedo, Maria de los Angeles, zo Semanario Judicial,
Quinta Epoca 430 (February zi, 1927). For exceptions to the general rule,
and for service of summons abroad, see art. io68, et seq., Codigo de Comercio
Reformado, Andrade, Mexico, 1936. However, such exceptions apparently
prc, uppose a jurisdiction in rem, by stipulation of the parties, or where per-
formance of the contract or the formal "place" of the contract is in Mexico
(-ee art. 1107).
'M lrreno Terrazas Abel y coag., 16 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca
515 (March io, 1925), par. 2, art. 14, Constitution, Mexico.
"'Codigo de Comercio Reformado, Andrade, Mexico, 1936.
Ib~idart- 1104. The competent court to take jurisdiction of the pro-
ccedings is that of the place of performance of the obligation. Sentencia,
April 8, 1931, Supreme Court of Spain.
,,I Art. I so5, C. de C., Andrade. When considering mercantile actions,
jurisdiction should be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Code
of Commerce, and the latter provides that when the place in which the debtor
is to be sued for payment has not been designated, nor the place in which to
perform the obligation, jurisdiction belongs to the court of the domicile of
the debtor, whatever may be the action brought. Rivera, Carmen, 25 Semana-
16 LAW JOURNAL-DECEMBER, 1939
In the instant case, no designation of a place of suit for
payment could have been made, as payment was effected in the
United States either in advance of or at the moment of delivery
in the United States, the place of performance would be shown
by the contract itself or the mutual correspondence which evi-
dences it,5" and in the absence of both designations, we would
still have the domicile of the defendant as the jurisdiction
within which to bring the action."
SPANISH CASE LAW
Much of the comparative legislation cited in the Mexican
Code of Commerce as footnotes to its articles is selected from
the Spanish code, thus it may be inferred that Spanish case law
would be persuasive in Mexico, although not necessarily bind-
ing upon Mexican courts. With this thought in mind, we cite
the case of D. J. P. v. D. E. R., decided by the Supreme Court
of Spain, August 5, 193oY
This was an action based upon the contract of compraventa
mercantil and was brought to recover the purchase price of
merchandise shipped "for the account and at the risk of the
purchaser." Plaintiff filed his action before the court of La
Bafieza, whereas defendant was a resident of Tuy. The defend-
ant filed a plea to the jurisdiction (competencia por inhibitoria),
alleging that in the absence of a written contract, as well as the
rio Judicial, Quinta Epoca 686 (September 5, 19z7). When competency
refers to the jurisdiction of a mercantile action, the provisions which are to be
taken into account to decide it are those of the Code of Commerce. Andressen,
Luis, 23 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca 370 (June i8, 1928).
" In accordance with the Mexican Code of Commerce, the court of the
place designated in the contract for the performance of the obligation will be
preferred over any other. Rafael Vega, 27 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca
335 (September 13, 1929).
50 Cf., Blair v. Newbegig, 65 Ohio St. 425, 439, 6z N.E. 1040 (1902):
An obligation resting upon contract may be enforced in any jurisdiction where
service may be had on the party.
57 Reported by Fernandez, Diccionario de Jurisprudencia, Madrid, Aug-
ust, 1930, p. 14. In reporting decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, it is
not unusual for the Spanish reporter to refer to the parties by their initials
only.
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fact that the draft had been sent to Tuy, the action should have
been filed against the defendant in Tuy, the court of his domi-
cile. The merchandise was "invoiced in the station of La
Bafieza."
Held: That upon the conclusion of a contract of purchase
and sale whereby the merchandise traveled at the risk and for
the account of the purchaser, and where payment was to be
made in La Baileza (the domicile of the plaintiff-vendor), it is
manifest that the court of La Bafieza is competent because the
latter is the place in which the obligation was to be performed.8
Furthermore, where delivery is made in the domicile of
the vendor, the court of the latter place takes jurisdiction of a
suit for payment of the price. The issue of a draft to collect
the price has no greater effect than the giving of facilities to the
debtor for the purpose of making good his debit. The fact that
the sale was made by a traveling representative is not a circum-
stance which may set aside the rule of competence."
Locus SOLUTIONIS
According to the facts upon which the present claim is
based, the obligation was performed wholly within the United
States and nowhere in Mexico. The vendor accepted the order
in the United States, manufactured the merchandise in the
United States, received payment in the United States, shipped
the merchandise to a point of embarkation in the United States,
and there the merchandise was taken over by an agent of the
plaintiff. From that point on, the merchandise traveled
through Mexico "at the risk and for the account of" the buyer
as his own merchandise, title already having passed, presum-
ably at the time of payment."
SCf., art. 156, sec. II, Codigo de Procedimientos Civiles, Santamaria,
Mexico, 1934.
" Sentencia, March 3, 1932, Supreme Court of Spain.
° Cf., Hall v. Cordell, 142 U.S. ii6, 120 (1891): The law of the
place of performance must determine the rights of the parties unless otherwise
stipulated.
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As we have seen, the type of action involved is the personal
action. Again relying upon Spanish law as persuasive in Mex-
ico, reference is made to the acci6n personal as described by
Manresa y Navarro. This class of action may be brought (i)
before the court of the place where the obligation is to be per-
formed, (2) before the court of the domicile of the defendant,
or (3) before the court of the place of the contract. If the par-
ties, upon entering into the contract, stipulate the place where
the obligation is to be performed, they have tacitly agreed that
all of its incidences may likewise have effect in the same place,
among them being the suit which may arise as to performance.
It follows that the court of the latter place is competent to take
jurisdiction and that it is competent with preference over any
other.6
The designation of the place in which the obligation is to
be performed is equivalent in civil law to a submission of the
parties to the court of that place. When nothing has been stip-
ulated in that regard, the plaintiff may elect between the court
of the domicile of the defendant and the court of the place of
the contract. But in the last named instance, the court is com--
petent only when the defendant is found in such place, even
though accidentally, to the end that he may be and is there
served 'with process. Without this circumstance, the court of
the place of the contract may not take jurisdiction of the suit,
and the plaintiff must have recourse to the court of the domicile
of the defendant. 2
The foregoing theory of venue based on performance is
strong, and goes beyond ours. It actually lays the venue of the
action at the place of performance in preference to any other
61 Manresa y Navarro, op. cit., p. 248. Cf., Banco de Londres y Mexico,
13 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca 735 (October 13, 1923): The Code
of Commerce provides that whatever the nature of the proceedings may be,
the court of the place designated in the contract for the performance of the
obligation will be preferred over any other court. Also, Pan-American Securi-
ties Corporation v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 993, IOOO
(1938): All matters connected with the performance of a contract are regu-
lated by the law of the place where the contract by its terms is to be performed.
62 Manresa y Navarro, op. cit., p. 249.
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forum, irrespective of the domicile of the defendant, whereas
our procedure permits an obligation resting upon contract to be
enforced in any jurisdiction where service may be had on the
party," although we presume to apply the law of the place of
performance." The civil law method is the simpler of the two.
Where the place of performance is stipulated, either party
knows where he may bring his action; he does not have to pur-
sue a defendant, who, under the theory just described, submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the place of performance when he
signs the contract.
Locus CONTRACTUS
The study of this field of the law of contracts embraces two
questions: Where was the contract perfected and when was the
contract perfected? That a forensic controversy regarding both
time and place has existed for many years is obvious from the
wealth of material available. In civil law, the question of time
and place of perfection of a mercantile contract rests upon four
theories," among them the theories of cognici6n and expedici6n.
The former insists that the contract is not completed until the
acceptance of the offeree is brought to the knowledge of the
offeror; the second maintains that the contract is completed as
soon as the acceptance is despatched.
By the gceat weight of English and American authorities,
, Blair v. Newbegin, note 56, sura.
Monahan v. N. 1'. Life Ins. Co., z6 F. Supp. 859, 86i (1939): The
contracts were made in the state of Arkansas, to be performed in the state of
New York, and the suits were instituted in the state of Oklahoma, this court
having jurisdiction of the parties. But the lex fori determines how and when
the law of the place of performance is to be applied (see p. 86z).
,, The four theories may be outlined in the following form: I-Informa-
ci~g or cognicibn-the acceptance must be brought to the knowledge of the
offeror. II-agifestaci6n-(a) theory of declaration-the contract is per-
fect at the moment in which the acceptance is exteriorized in any form;
(b) theory of expediciin-requires, apart from the manifestation of the accept-
ance, that the latter has been directed to the offeror even when it does not
require that it has arrived in his hands; (c) theory of recepci n-according
to this, it is required that the material document containing the acceptance has
arrived in the hands of the offeror. See Gay de Montelli, Tratado de la
Legislaci6n Comercial Espafiola, Barcelona, 1930, vol. I, pp. 204, 205.
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acceptance, if made by mail or telegraph, is operative from the
moment its transmission begins,6" and a contract made by cor-
respondence is made at the place where the letter of acceptance
is posted."' Stated in slightly different terminology, the place
at which a contract is made is the place at which the offer is
accepted."
That a conflict between the two civil law theories mentioned
above has existed even as to the respective codes of the same
country is evident from a study of Spanish and Mexican civil
and commercial law. The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 follows
the theory of cognici6n; the acceptance made by letter does not
bind the person making the offer until it is brought to his
knowledge. In such cases, the contract is presumed to have
been perfected in the place in which the offer was made.6" On
the other hand, the Code of Commerce of 1885 of the same
country declares that mercantile contracts celebrated by cor-
respondence are perfect "as soon as it may be answered accept-
ing the proposal" (desde que se conteste aceptando la pro pu-
esta), ° thus following the theory of expedici6n.7 '
The same conflict obtains in the Mexican codes. Like the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the Mexican Civil Code of 1928
provides that the contract is formed at the moment in which the
proponent receives the acceptance," whereas the Mexican Code
66 Page, The Law of Contracts, 2d ed., 192o, vol. I, sec. 199, p. 296;
sec. 215, p. 317. In Ohio, an assignment was complete and effectual to pass
title to the assignee from the time the deed was placed in the post office as
against subsequent attaching creditors. Johnson v. Sharp, 31 Ohio St. 611
(1877).
67 Page, op. cit., sec. 214, p. 317. Under New York law a contract is
made at the time and place where the final act necessary for its formation is
done. Cray v. Hegarty, 27 F. Supp. 93, 96 (1939)-
6 Page, op. Cit., sec. 214, p. 317. It is well settled that a contract is made
at the place where the letter of acceptance is mailed, such being the place
where the last act necessary to the formation of the contract is performed.
C. H. Parker Co. v. Exeter Refiiing Co., 79 Pac. (ad) (Cal.) 1114, 1115
(1938)-
69 Art. iz6?, Spanish Civil Code, 1889.
70 Art. 54, Spanish Code of Commerce, I 885.
71 As discussed by Gay de Montelli, op. cit., p. 204, et sey.
72 Art. 1807, Mexican Civil Code, 1928.
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of Commerce holds to the theory of expedici6n appearing in the
Spanish Code of Commerce of I885, and employs identically
the same text-desde que se conteste aceptando la propuesta. 
3
This raises a question of law, that is, whether civil or commer-
cial law is applicable.
Many commercial codes provide that in those cases which
are not governed by the rules of commercial law, the provisions
of the civil code will be applied.74 This, however, is not true of
the Mexican Code of Commerce, which expressly declares that,
"in the absence of provisions of this Code, those of the common
law shall be applicable to acts of commerce."'' Therefore, we
find ourselves restricted to the Code of Commerce and the com-
mon law for an interpretation of the commercial legislation of
Mexico."
The same rule, slightly enlarged, obtains in the Spanish
Code of Commerce of i885. 7 In contemplation of these rules,
the conclusion follows that the provisions of the Mexican Code
of Commerce will prevail in the instant case of a mercantile
contract of purchase and sale, there being no "absence of pro-
visions" which would necessitate turning to the Civil Code or
the common law for a guiding rule. Consequently, the theory
of expedici6n will be the basis for determining the time and
the place of the contract.
' Art. So, Codigo de Comercio Reformado, Andrade, Mexico, 1936.
7-1 Art. i, Titulo Preliminar, and art. 207, Argentine Code of Commerce,
1932 edition; art. 8, Venezuelan Code of Commerce, I9i9.
7' Art. z, Codigo etc., Andrade, Mexico, 1936.
7'As exceptions to the general rule, the provisions of the civil law, with
the modifications and restrictions of the Code of Commerce, will be applicable
to acts of commerce respecting capacity of the parties, and the exceptions and
caus: which rescind or invalidate contracts. See art. 8I, Codigo de Comercio
Reformado, Andrade, Mexico, 1936. In order that the common law be
applied to mercantile transactions it is necessary that a provision for the case
be lacking in the Code of Commerce, that is to say, when dealing with a mer-
cantile matter it leaves it without a complement. In general terms, the civil
law' is applicable to acts of commerce when the matter, by its nature, does not
fit into the terms of commercial law. Compaiiia Minera de Naica, 8 Sema-
nario Judicial, Quinta Epoca 50, 53 (January 6, 19z).
77 Art z, Spanish Code of Commerce, iS85. See also, the comments by
Lorenzo Benito in his Manual de Derecho Mercantil, 3d ed., Madrid, 1924,
vol. a, secs. I188, 1189, pp. z42, Z43; sec. 1197, p. 247.
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Thus, in Mexican commercial law a mercantile contract is
per fect as soon as the offer is accepted (answered) by the
offeree, and the perfection of the contract is not delayed until
the answer reaches the offeror, but takes place as soon as the
answer is despatched by letter or telegram."' The time at
which the contractual obligation is born is the date of despatch
of the acceptance by the offeree, and not the date of its receipt
by the offeror. If a Mexican buyer writes to an American
manufacturer, extending an offer to purchase, the contract is
perfect as soon as the American manufacturer posts his letter
of acceptance, and the "place" of such a mercantile contract
would be within the United States.Ya
MEXICAN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A legal principle of importance in the present case remains
to be discussed briefly-the time limit within which claims for
apparent or hidden defects may be made. Article 383 of the
Mexican Code of Commerce provides that
The purchaser who, within five days from receipt of the merchan-
dise fails to present his claim to the vendor in writing for deficiencies of
quality or quantity, or who, within thirty days from date of receipt, fails
to claim for hidden defects (vcios internos), loses his right of action
and his right to recover against the vendor for such causes.
This is interpreted and sustained by the Supreme Court of
Mexico in the Rawlings case:
When no claim has been filed within due time for deficiencies of
78 Art. 8o, Codigo de Comercio Reformado, Andrade, Mexico, 1936. A
telegram will produce a binding effect between the parties only when this
means has been admitted previously in writing, and provided that the tele-
grams contain the conventional signs previously agreed upon by the parties.
78a The following decisions of the Supreme Court of Mexico would seem
to substantiate these conclusions: Ramriez v. Elorduy, zo Semanario Judicial,
Quinta Epoca 365, 368 (February 12, 1927); Juan Garcia Ruiz v. Jose
Maria Zubirin, 14 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca 1481, 1493, 1494
(May z, 19z4) ; Mier v. Roman, 19 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca 68,
7' (July 13, 1926); Sociedad Francisco Beriscin, iS Semanario Judicial,
Quinta Epoca 489, 490, 493 (March 6, i926).
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quality or quantity, the presumption exists in favor of the vendor that
the order was filled correctly."M
The Gornez decision is possibly more inclusive in its rul-
ings. In addition to giving the substantial requirements of the
contract of comnpraventa, it lays down the following principles
relative to a sale by samples or standard qualities :7a
The purchase and sale which is made according to samples and
qualities of merchandise, determined and known in commerce, will be
held perfect by the mere consent of the parties, and the buyer who does
not claim in due time for deficiencies of quality or quantity of the mer-
chandise or the hidden defects of the same, will lose all action and right
to recover against the vendor for such causes, and when he does not
make such a claim, he must be deemed satisfied with the merchandise
purchased.
OFFEROR AND OFFEREE
Who the offeror is in the present case can be determined
only as a question of fact. If the plaintiff made the initial ad-
vance, offering so much money for the merchandise, then the
plaintiff is the offeror. If the reverse is true, that is, if the
American manufacturer offered to sell the Mexican importer
so much material at such and such a price, then the manufac-
turer is the offeror. Mere inquiry on the part of the importer
as to terms and conditions would not constitute a valid offer.
Although the identity of the offeror might operate to
change the "place" of the contract, this would seem to have
little material effect, in view of the attendant circumstances,
upon the rights or remedies of the parties, inasmuch as the
7R l jzsjs Madzu.facturizg Co., 33 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca
1637, 163 8, 1640, 1641, 1642 (October 26, 1931). Also, the Code of Com-
mcrcu ordrs that the terms fixed for the exercise of actions proceeding from
mercantile acts shill be fatal. Banco Occidental de Mexico, z5 Semanario
Judicial, Quinta Epoca 290 (January 24, 1929). In treating of mercantile
acts, prescription should be governed by the Code of Commerce, not by the
provisions of the common law, and in conformity with the former, ten years
arc needed for the lapsing of mercantile obligations, except when the said code
indicates a shorter period. Leay, Renj, 22 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca
g16, SiS (March 16, 19z8).
79, Gomez, Pedro, 13 Semanario Judicial, Quinta Epoca io86 (Decem-
ber io, 1923).
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place of performance was in the United States, and the pro-
posed defendant was not and is not legally found in Mexico.
WHAT CONSTITUTES "DOING BUSINESS"
For purposes of the income tax law, the Mexican Govern-
ment has expressly ruled that
When the agent is not a representative with juridical power to bind
his principal, but (is) what is called a simple messenger (nuncio) in
doctrine, and the power to decide upon the acceptance of the order is
reserved to the home office abroad, the contract is not to be understood
as concluded in the Republic, but in the place of the domicile of the
home office.8°
A study of the American decisions mentioned in the foot-
note below will disclose that they are practically identical in
theory and principle with the ruling of the Mexican Govern-
ment cited immediately above. The conclusion seems proper
that Mexican and American law is in agreement in this par-
ticular.8
80 See Circular No. 211-8-ioo relativa a la debida interpretaci6n del
articulo 14. de la Ley del Impuesto Sobre La Renta, Diario Oficial No. z2,
Mexico, June 7, 1939. It will be noted that this ruling is based directly on
article 8o of the Mexican Code of Commerce.
sl Coblentz & Logsdon v. Powell, 148 Ark. 151, 229 S.W. 25, 26
(1921); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 1;6 Ga. 789, 120 S.E. 120 (1923);
Am. Contractor Pub. Co. v. Michael Nocenti Co., 139 N.Y.S. 853 (1913);
Brookford Mills, Inc. v. Baldwin, 139 N.Y.S. 195 (1913); Hopping v. Gear
Medicine Co., 153 N.E. 231, 23z (1926); McLarran; v. Longdin-Brugger
Co., 157 N.E. 8z8, 829 (1926).
